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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
the regulations were unenforceable for want of proper publication." The
Fourth Circuit decision is in keeping with numerous opinions which have
held that failure to satisfy Federal Register publication requirements in-
validates a regulation."0 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit noted that Appalachian
Power Co. v. Train was the second time the EPA had been chastised for
failing to observe APA publication requirements.3 1 The court affirmed that
an interested party's cognizance of a regulation, but not of the regulation's
specific contents and applicability, does not constitute effective notice.32
The holding reaffirmed a well-established maxim of administrative law
that persons supplying goods and services to the government are entitled
to notice of the standards and procedures which regulate these relation-
ships.n3
GRETCHEN CECILA FRANCES SHAPPERT
II. ADMIRALTY
A. Shipowner's Duty of Care to Longshoremen
In 1972, Congress added several amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harborworker's Compensation Act (LHWCA)1 in an attempt to alle-
viate the vast amount of litigation instituted by injured longshoremen
Id. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976).
30 See Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977) (food stamp instructions requiring
that certain housing subsidies paid by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
be treated as income were invalid for failure to publish in the Federal Register because they
affected more than internal proceedings and had a significant impact on food stamp recipi-
ents); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976) (Indian Health Service
memorandum making off-reservation Indians ineligible for contract care policies held void
for lack of publication); Piercy v. Tarr, 343 F. Supp. 1120, 1127-29 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (directives
of the Selective Service System in the form of letters to state directors were "regulations"
void for failure to publish); In re Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 1339, 1348 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), affl'd, 472 F.2d 1382 (1973) (unpublished Navy regulation did not bind parties
unaware of its existence); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Assoc. v. Ricks, 83 Misc. 2d 814, 820-21,
372 N.Y.S.2d 485, 592-93 (1975) (departmental handbook of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development held invalid for failure to publish). See also Pinkus v. Reilly, 157 F.
Supp. 548, 551 (D.N.J. 1957); United States v. Morelock, 124 F. Supp. 932 (D. Md. 1954);
note 18 supra.
3' 566 F.2d at 457; see Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 221-22 (4th Cir. 1975), remanded
for consideration of mootness, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). The Fourth Circuit held that EPA regula-
tion of automobile traffic in Maryland, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, was invalid due to lack
of notice and publication in accordance with the rulemaking provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3)
(1976). 530 F.2d at 221-22.
32 566 F.2d at 457.
m Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Cuneo v. Schlesin-
ger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (D.C. Cir. 1973); W. G. Cosby Transfer & Storage Co. v. Froehlke,
480 F.2d 498, 502-03 (4th Cir. 1973).
Act of October 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-
950 (1970) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)).
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against shipowners. 2 In furtherance of this intent, Congress abolished the
doctrine of unseaworthiness as the basis for a longshoremen's action
against a shipowner under the LHWCA.3 Congress did not intend, how-
ever, that a shipowner should be relieved of all responsibility for longshore-
man injuries.' Therefore, the 1972 Amendments preserved the right of
action against a shipowner by a longshoreman who is injured as a result of
a shipowner's negligence.' Although Congress indicated that a longshore-
man's right of action, as well as the determination of a shipowner's liabil-
2 In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a
shipowner owes to a longshoreman the nondelegable duty of maintaining his vessel in a
seaworthy condition. When any condition or act caused injury to a longshoreman while
aboard a vessel, the vessel was deemed unseaworthy, and therefore in violation of the shi-
powner's duty of care. Id. at 99-100. By breaching this duty of care, the shipowner became
liable for the full amount of an injured longshoreman's damages. Id.; see G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, JR., THE LAw OF AD mALTY §§ 6-38 to 6-44, 6-53 to 6-54 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as GiLMORE & BLACK].
Since the unseaworthiness doctrine, in effect, placed no fault liability on a shipowner,
suits by injured longshoremen against shipowners soon proliferated. H. R. REP. No. 92-1441,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4702-03
[hereinafter cited as HousE.REoRT]. During the Congressional hearings on the 1972 Amend-
ments, a House Committee discovered that such suits were a primary device for injured
longshoremen to supplement the inadequate statutory compensation received from stevedore-
employers. HOUSE RE'oRT, supra at 4702. Although shipowners initially bore the cost of
longshoremen's recoveries, the shipowners could seek indemnity from the longshoremen's
stevedores for any awards paid to longshoremen. Id. In effect, the full cost of adequate
compensation for longshoreman injuries, the goal of the LHWCA, was borne by stevedores
despite an exclusivity provision in the LHWCA which made compensation payments a steve-
dore's sole obligation to an injured longshoreman. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970) (amended
1972). Because of the substantial litigation expenses necessary to adequately compensate
longshoremen for their injures, the House Committee decided that relief for injured workers
would be effectuated best by eliminating the costs of litigation and using these savings to
increase statutory compensation paid to longshoremen. HOUSE REPORT, supra at 4702-03; see
note 3 infra.
HOUSE REPrR, supra note 2, at 4703. The House Committee determined that a major
reason for the application of the unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen was to supplement
the inadequate compensation payments under the 1927 LHWCA. Id. Since the 1972 Amend-
ments increased compensation payments for longshoremen, the Committee reasoned that
there was no longer a financial need for the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Id.; see note 2
supra. In addition, the Committee concluded that the unseaworthiness doctrine was devel-
oped originally to protect seamen who were exposed to the many hazards of long sea voyages.
HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4703. In contrast, a longshoreman who works on board a vessel
for a short time is not exposed to a seaman's hazardous employment conditions, and there-
fore, has no need for the protection of the unseaworthiness doctrine. Id.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4703.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). Under § 905(b), a shipowner remains liable for his own
negligent acts or omissions which cause injury to longshoremen. Id. The shipowner, however,
is not liable for injuries caused by a stevedore's negligence. Id. In addition, a longshoreman
cannot base his negligence action against the shipowner on the doctrine of unseaworthiness
or a nondelegable duty. Id.; see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4701-04; GILMoRE & BLACK,
supra note 2, at § 6-57; Robertson, Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners
under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
7 J. OF MAR. L. & COM. 447 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
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ity, is to be governed by land based negligence principles.' Congress did
not specify which land based principles of negligence govern the shi-
powner's duty of care.7 Instead, Congress decided that the courts are the
appropriate forum for ascertaining which land based principles should be
applied to a longshoreman's action under the amended LHWCA.' In
Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd.,I the Fourth Circuit considered the applicability
of several land based principles of negligence,"0 port custom" and federal
regulations" in establishing the shipowner's duty of care to a longshoreman
under the 1972 Amendments.
The plaintiff, Augustus Chavis, was a longshoreman employee of the
Tidewater Stevedoring Company. 3 In February, 1975, the defendant shi-
powner, Finnlines, Ltd., contracted with Tidewater to load a cargo of logs
and herb bales aboard a Finnlines ship. After Finnlines relinquished con-
trol of the cargo operations to Tidewater, Chavis and other members of a
longshoring gang supervised by Tidewater proceeded to load the logs into
the ship's hold." Sometime during the loading operation, a rainstorm
made a clay coating on the logs extremely slippery. Despite this hazardous
condition, the gang finished loading the logs without a mishap. 5 Disre-
garding the port custom of placing wooden planks, called dunnage, be-
tween different types of cargo to prevent slippery conditions from causing
injury, the longshoring gang then loaded the bales of herbs directly on the
slippery logs. While loading these bales, Chavis injured his back." As a
result of this injury, Chavis received statutory compensation payments
from Tidewater. 7 Chavis then instituted a suit against Finnlines alleging
£ HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4703-05.
, Id.
Id. The House Committee realized that its failure to specify which land based negli-
gence principles are appropriate in longshoreman actions would cause uncertainty regarding
whether a shipowner acted negligently in a particular situation. Id. The Committee decided,
however, that this uncertainty should be resolved through the ordinary process of litigation.
Id. at 4704. Despite the discretion granted to the courts in ascertaining the applicable land
based principles, the Committee indicated that the principles adopted by the courts should
be nationally uniform. Id. at 4705.
9 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978).
'o See text accompanying notes 22-48 infra.
" See note 23 infra.
22 See id.
' 576 F.2d at 1074.
, Id. at 1074-75.
' Id.
2 Id. at 1075. At trial, Chavis claimed that his injury occurred when he slipped while
pushing a bale of herbs into place. Id. However, a supervisory employee, not present at the
accident, testified that Chavis did not mention the fall or injury on the day of the accident.
Furthermore, Chavis did not mention the fall on his LHWCA compensation form. Id. Indeed,
there was testimony that after the accident Chavis claimed that his injury was caused simply
by attempting to lift a heavy load. Id. at 1075-76.
17 Under § 903 of the LHWCA, a longshoreman injured in the course of his employment
may receive statutory payments. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1976). To receive compensation payments,
a longshoreman must submit an application to the deputy commissioner of the LHWCA or a
LHWCA board. Id. § 919. Thereafter, the commissioner or board determines the validity of
1979]
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that Finnlines failed to provide Chavis with a safe place to work. After a
jury verdict in Finnline's favor, Chavis appealed. 8
On appeal, Chavis asserted that the trial judge had given erroneous
instructions to the jury and had failed to give instructions that he had
requested.19 The trial judge had instructed the jury that a shipowner owes
the same duty of ordinary care to a longshoreman which a possessor of land
owes to a business invitee.0 Chavis claimed, however, that the jury should
have been instructed that a shipowner and a stevedore owe a longshoreman
the joint duty of maintaining the ship as a safe place to work."' In addition,
Chavis claimed that under certain circumstances a special limitation
should be placed on a shipowner's usual immunity from liability for inju-
ries caused by open and obvious dangers.2 Moreover, Chavis contended
the longshoreman's application, whether the longshoreman's injury was covered by the
LHWCA and, if the application is approved, makes a formal award of compensation to the
longshoreman. See id. Once a formal compensation award is granted, the longshoreman is
entitled to a statutorily determined schedule of payments based on the severity of the injury
and the duration of his absence from work. Id. § 908.
576 F.2d at 1074.
" Id. at 1074, 1076; see text accompanying notes 22-48 infra.
576 F.2d at 1076 n.2. The trial judge instructed the jury that a shipowner owes to any
business invitee the duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstance to maintain the
ship in a reasonably safe condition for the invitee's use. Id. The judge further instructed the
jury that if a shipowner should find a latent defect while exercising due care, the shipowner
has a duty to warn the invitee of the defect, but has no duty to correct open and obvious
dangers. Id.
21 Id. at 1077. Chavis asserted the reason for retaining the longshoreman's right of action
against a shipowner under the 1972 amendments was Congress' desire for shipowners to have
a duty to take any reasonable precautions to prevent the possibility of injury to longshoremen.
Id., citing HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4704. Chavis also relied on Marant v. Farrell Lines,
Inc., 1976 A.M.C. 504 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd, 550 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1977), in which the district
court concluded that under the 1972 Amendments, Congress intended shipowners and
stevedores to share the responsibility for longshoreman safety. 576 F.2d at 1077.
2 576 F.2d at 1078-79. Chavis contended that the land based negligence principles con-
tained in § 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts should have been included in the trial
court's jury instructions. Id. Under § 343A, a possessor of land does not normally have a duty
to correct open and obvious dangers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrS § 343A (1965). How-
ever, if the possessor of land should anticipate that an entrant will not be able to avoid an
open and obvious danger, or may be injured despite the open and obvious nature of the
condition, the possessor's duty of care changes. Id.; see Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976). Under these circumstances, if the possessor of land fails to correct
such an open and obvious danger, he is liable for injuries caused by the danger. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 343A (1965). Chavis, citing Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1976), contended that § 343A is applicable to longshoreman actions against shipown-
ers and that a shipowner has the legal duties of a possessor of land as set out in the Restate-
ment. 576 F.2d at 1079; see note 36 infra. Chavis also asserted that the court should have
determined whether the shipowner was in a better position to discover and correct the danger-
ous condition than the longshoreman's stevedore. If the shipowner were in a better position,
then his failure to correct the situation constituted a violation of the § 343A standard of care.
576 F.2d at 1079.
In addition, Chavis claimed that an instruction based on § 343A was necessary to place
the longshoreman plaintiff in the same legal position as the plaintiff in a land based negli-
gence suit. Id.; see text accompanying notes 6-7 supra. The trial judge's refusal to admit a §
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that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that a shipowner owes
a special duty of care to a longshoreman when the shipowner, or a steve-
dore employed by the shipowner, engages in a dangerous activity.3 The
343A instruction to the jury thus gave Finnlines an advantage not had by land based defen-
dants. 576 F.2d at 1079.
2 576 F.2d at 1080-81. Chavis contended that §§ 413 and 416 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts set forth appropriate standards of care for a shipowner who hires an independent
stevedore to conduct stevedoring operations. Id. Section 413 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides:
One who employes an independent contractor to do work which the employer
should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk
of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm, caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the
employer (a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such
precautions, or (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner
for the taking of such precautions.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Tours, § 413 (1965). Similarly, § 416 of the Restatement provides:
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should
recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to
others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm
caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take
such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in
the contract or otherwise.
REPATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRs § 416 (1965). Chavis contended that although these two.
sctions still place the primary responsibility for longshoreman safety on the stevedore, a
shipowner should have a duty to protect longshoreman from the risks of extrahazardous
activities. 576 F.2d at 1081.
In addition, Chavis claimed that the jury should have been allowed to evaluate the
shipowner's conduct in light of relevant regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). 576 F.2d at 1081. In particular, these regulations require ships to
be maintained free of hazards that may cause slips or falls. 29 C.F.R. § 1918.91 (1978). In
addition, OSHA regulations require that slippery conditions should be eliminated as the
conditions occur. Id. Chavis claimed violations of OSHA regulations by a stevedore should
render a shipowner liable to a longshoreman for negligence. 576 F.2d at 1081; see Venable v.
A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968); Provenza v. American
Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964). Since the
precedent relied on by Chavis arose under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, which was abol-
ished by the 1972 Amendments, 576 F.2d at 1082; see text accompanying note 2-3 supra, the
Fourth Circuit held that the relevant regulations do not impose a duty on shipowners since
the regulations only apply to a longshoreman's employer. 576 F.2d at 1082; accord, Brown v.
Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1977); Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co.,
435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977); see OSHA, 29 C.F.R. § 1918.2 (1978).
Chavis also claimed that the trial court erred in submitting an instruction to the jury on
contributory negligence. 576 F.2d at 1082. Chavis, citing Smith v. Whitehall Terminal Corp.,
336 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1964), claimed that only evidence of a plaintiff's deliberate use of
an unsafe work method, despite the availability of a safer alternative, would establish plain-
tiff's contributory negligence. 576 F.2d at 1082-83. Chavis contended that because Finnlines
failed to prove that Chavis deliberately had chosen to use an unsafe work method, Finnlines
was not entitled to a contributory negligence instruction. Id. at 1083. Without elaborating,
the Fourth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury might have
concluded that an alternative safe work method could have been used to load the herb bales.
Id.; see text accompanying note 15-16 supra. Finally, Chavis contended that the jury should
have been instructed that a shipowner's failure to supply dunnage, in violation of port cus-
tom, constituted negligence. 576 F.2d at 1084, citing Bess v. Agromar Lines, 518 F.2d 738 (4th
1979]
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Fourth Circuit rejected Chavis's assertions, holding that a shipowner needs
only to exercise reasonable care to keep the vessel in a reasonably safe
condition for longshoremen working on board.'4
In rejecting Chavis's claim that a shipowner and a stevedore have a
joint responsibility for longshoremen safety, 8 the court agreed with the
district court's instruction that a shipowner owes only the duty of ordinary
care to a longshoreman.2 The court reasoned that an instruction which,
taken as a whole, embodies appropriate principles of law should not be
overturned lightly on appeal." The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 1972
Amendments relieve shipowners of the nondelegable duty to provide for
longshoreman safety.28 Instead, the primary responsibility for longshore-
man safety rests on a longshoreman's stevedore employer. 2 The court fur-
ther reasoned that a negligence action against a shipowner must be decided
according to land based principles." Therefore, since the trial court's in-
struction did not place responsibility for longshoreman safety on shipown-
ers3' and embodied land based negligence principles which did not conflict
with any precedent, the Fourth Circuit upheld the instruction." The
Chavis court recognized, however, that a disagreement exists concerning
the exact delineation of responsibility for longshoremen safety between
shipowners and stevedores." The court suggested that the Fourth Circuit,
in appropriate circumstances, might hold the shipowner, rather than the
stevedore, responsible for providing a longshoreman with a safe place to
work.u
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Chavis's claim that the facts of his
Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit rejected Chavis's contention, holding that under Bess, a
shipowner does not have an absolute legal duty to supply dunnage and that port custom did
not create such a duty. 576 F.2d at 1084.
2, Id. at 1076-81.
21 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
2, 576 F.2d at 1078; see text accompanying note 20 supra.
576 F.2d at 1076.
Id. at 1077; see Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977); text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
21 576 F.2d at 1078, citing HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4702-04; George, The Content
of the Negligence Action by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972Amendments
to the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act, 2 MAR. LAw. 15, 34 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as George]. The Fourth Circuit discounted Chavis's reliance on Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc.,
1976 A.M.C. 504 (E.D. Pa. 1976) since that opinion was reversed. See 576 F.2d at 1078;
Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third Circuit in Marant held
that the imposition of a joint duty of a shipowner and stevedore to provide for longshoreman
safety contravened the congressional intent to place primary responsibility for longshoreman
safety on stevedores. 550 F.2d at 144.
3o 576 F.2d at 1078; see text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
3, See note 20 supra.
32 576 F.2d at 1078.
Id.; see George, supra note 29, at 34.
, 576 F.2d at 1078. The Fourth Circuit suggested that in a factual setting different from
Chavis, it might be inclined to place a higher duty of care on a shipowner for longshoreman
safety. Id. However, where, as in Chavis, the stevedore and not the shipowner was negligent,
the stevedore alone bears the responsibility for a longshoreman's injury. Id.
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case required the imposition of a special limitation on a shipowner's usual
immunity from liability for injures caused by open and obvious dangers.3 5
In denying the claim, the Chavis court suggested that in other circumstan-
ces,3" a shipowner might have a duty to correct open and obvious dangers
which pose extraordinary7 risks of harm. 8 However, the court decided that
Chavis was not an appropriate case for the imposition of such a duty
because the stevedore, not the shipowner, allowed the open and obvious
danger to occur.39 Since Congress intended to hold shipowners responsible
only for their own negligence, 0 the court reasoned that Finnlines should
not be held liable for this particular open and obvious danger." Therefore,
as a general rule, whenever a stevedore or its employees create any danger-
ous condition, whether open and obvious or not, the shipowner is exempt
from liability for injuries caused by that condition.2
The Chavis court also affirmed the trial court's rejection of Chavis's
requested instruction that a shipowner has a special responsibility for the
safety of a longshoreman when the shipowner or his hired stevedore en-
gages in a dangerous activity.3 The court determined that giving the in-
struction would impose vicarious liability on a shipowner for the negligent
actions of persons providing longshoring services to the vessel. The court
equated this vicarious liability with the nondelegable duty abolished by
the 1972 Amendments.44 Moreover, the court reasoned that the standard"
576 F.2d at 1079; see text accompanying note 22 supra.
' Chavis relied on Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1976), to support
the imposition of a special limitation on a shipowner's nonliability for open and obvious
dangers. 576 F.2d at 1079. In Napoli, a longshoreman plaintiff was injuryed by an open and
obvious danger that arose after the commencement of cargo operations. 536 F.2d at 506.
Contrary to ordinary practice, the shipowner had acted as a stevedore and thus was Napoli's
immediate employer. Id. At trial, the shipowner attempted to escape liability for Napoli's
injuries by claiming immunity from negligence actions under the LHWCA. Id. at 507-08.
Alternatively, the shipowner claimed that in his capacity as shipowner, he did not owe Napoli
the stevedore's duty to provide a safe place to work. Id. The Second Circuit rejected both of
these theories, concluding that the shipowner should not escape liability merely because of
the unusual employment relationship. Id. Since the plaintiff was injured by an open and
obvious danger, the Napoli court concluded that § 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
reflected the appropriate standard of care. 536 F.2d at 508. The Chavis court agreed with the
Napoli court's holding that when a shipowner is a direct employer of a longshoreman, then §
343A sets forth the shipowner's duty of care regarding open and obvious dangers. 576 F.2d at
1079-80. However, because Napoli involved a special employment relationship, the Chavis
court limited Napoli to its unique factual situation. Id.; accord, Munoz v. Flota Merchante
Grancolombiana, 553 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1977) (limiting Napoli to its facts).
31 See note 22 supra.
576 F.2d at 1079.
:' Id. The court noted that at the time of Chavis's injury, Tidewater controlled loading
operations aboard Finnline's ship. Id. Moreover, the slippery condition which supposedly
caused Chavis's fall occurred after Tidewater assumed control of the cargo operations. Id.
10 Id. at 1079-80,, citing Riddle v. Exxon Trans. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1112 (4th Cir. 1977);
see Robertson, supra note 5, at 473.
' 576 F.2d at 1080.
" Id., citing Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co.; 563 F.2d 1103, 1112 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1081; see text accompanying note 23 supra.
" 576 F.2d at 1081, citing Brown v. Ivarans Rederi A/S, 545 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
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which Chavis relied on to impose vicarious liability on the shipowner for a
stevedore's negligent acts benefits only "other" third parties injured by the
stevedore's negligence."6 Since the prevailing authority defined "other" as
excluding a stevedore's longshoremen employees, 17 the Fourth Circuit
adopted this definition of "other", thereby excluding Chavis from the ben-
efits of this type of vicarious liability. 8
In many respects, Chavis is in accordance with the principles of negli-
gence applied by the Fourth Circuit to a longshoreman's action against a
shipowner under the 1972 Amendments and is consistent with the position
of other circuits." In recognition that the 1972 Amendments abolished the
doctrine of unseaworthiness" as a basis for longshoreman actions against
shipowners," the Fourth Circuit has denied recovery in longshoreman ac-
tions which were based on the theory that a shipowner has a nondelegable
duty of care for longshoreman safety.2 In addition, the Fourth Circuit has
placed the responsibility for longshoreman safety on the stevedore because
of apparent congressional intent 3 and practical considerations." With re-
denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977).
45 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
" 576 F.2d at 1081; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tours §§ 413, 416 (1965).
, 576 F.2d at 1081, citing Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
576 F.2d at 1081.
' See notes 51-57 infra.
See note 2 supra.
5' Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 758 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1098 (1977); Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1976); accord,
Hickman v. Jugoslovenska Linijska Plovidba Rijeska "Zvir", 570 F.2d 449,451 (2d Cir. 1978);
Brown v. Mitsubishi Shintaku Ginko, 550 F.2d 331, 332 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977); Ramirez v. Toko
Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see text accompanying note 28 supra.
52 Bess v. Agromar Line, 518 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1975); see text accompanying note
28 supra. In Bess, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the concept of a nondelegable duty of care
to provide for the safety of a longshoreman is a corollary of the unseaworthiness doctrine. 518
F.2d at 742. The Bess court concluded that any nondelegable duty which holds a shipowner
liable for another's actions frustrates the intent of the 1972 Amendments. Id. Thus, the Bess
court held that requiring a shipowner to provide a safe place to work for a longshoreman
constitutes a nondelegable duty. Id.; see text accompanying notes 21, 25-30 supra. In Riddle
v. Exxon Trans. Co., 563 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth Circuit held that requiring a
shipowner to share with the stevedore the responsibility for longshoreman safety also imposes
a nondelegable duty on the shipowner. Id. at 1110; accord, Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550
F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 28-29 supra. The Riddle court also held
that an instruction based on §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is
improper where a party other than the shipowner negligently injures a longshoreman. 563
F.2d at 1112-13; accord, Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana 553 F.2d 837, 841 (2d
Cir. 1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239-40 (5th Cir. 1977);
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 484, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1977); see text accompa-
nying notes 35-42, supra. In addition, the Riddle court quoted with approval the decision in
Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1251 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977),
in which the court rejected the use of §§ 413 and 416 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
to hold a shipowner vicariously liable for the acts of a stevedore during hazardous activities.
563 F.2d at 1112-13; accord, Hess v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); see text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
11 Riddle v. Exxon Trans. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1109 (4th Cir. 1977); accord, Marant v.
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
spect to the shipowner's duty of care to longshoremen, the Fourth Circuit
has recognized that land based negligence principles should govern actions
by longshoremen under the 1972 Amendments.55 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
has adopted the position that a shipowner owes the same duty of care to
longshoremen which a landowner owes to business invitees 6 Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit has found that Congress did not intend a shipowner to bear
any liability for the negligence of a stevedore or the stevedore's employ-
ees.57
In enacting the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA, Congress intended
to change longshoreman actions against shipowners in three respects: to
abolish the doctrine of unseaworthiness and any other nondelegable shi-
powner duties for longshoreman safety,58 to place longshoremen in the
same legal position as land based plaintiffs with respect to actions against
negligent employers,5" and to achieve national uniformity in the applica-
tion of negligence principles to longshoreman actions."0 The court in Chavis
has continued the Fourth Circuit's efforts to implement these changes by
reaffirming the rejection of the unseaworthiness doctrine,' by refusing to
impose the nondelegable duties of joint responsibility62 for longshoreman
safety and vicarious liability for stevedore negligence on shipowners, 3 and
Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 144 (3d Cir. 1977); see text accompanying note 29 supra.
" The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because a stevedore normally directly supervises
longshoremen during cargo operations, a stevedore is in a better position than a shipowner
to discover and correct dangerous conditions which arise during those loading operations.
Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1112 (4th Cir. 1977); accord, Munoz v. Flota
Merchante Grancolombiana, S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1977).
m Riddle v. Exxon Trans. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1110 (4th Cir. 1977); Anuszewski v. Dy-
namic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 758 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977);
accord, Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
861 (1977); Gay v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1977); see
text accompanying note 30 supra.
5 Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 759 (4th Cir. 1976); accord, Gay
v. Ocean Transp. & Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1977); Ramirez v. Toko
Kaiun, 385 F. Supp. 644, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see text accompanying notes 20 & 26 supra.
A shipowner must make a reasonable inspection of the ship and inform a longshoreman of
latent or hidden defects. Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1110-11 (4th Cir. 1977);
accord, Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
861 (1977); Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun, 385 F. Supp. 644, 652 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see text accompa-
nying note 37 supra. However, a shipowner is under no duty to correct open and obvious
dangers. Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1111 (4th Cir. 1977); accord, Hurst v.
Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); Ramirez
v. Toko Kaiun, 385 F. Supp. 644, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1974); see text accompanying notes 35-42
supra.
11 Riddle v. Exxon Transp. Co., 563 F.2d 1103, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1977); accord, Gay v.
Ocean Transp. & Trading Co., Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233, 1239-40 (5th Cir. 1977); see text accompa-
nying notes 40-42 supra.
I House REPoRT, supra note 2, at 4703-04.
5' Id. at 4703.
10 Id. at 4705.
"1 See text accompanying notes 28 & 50-52 supra.
,2 See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
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by adopting a standard of care for shipowners predicated on land based
negligence principles."
B. Apportionment of Damages
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) I gives a longshoreman injured on the job two methods by which
to obtain compensation for his injuries. If the longshoreman is injured by
a negligent act of a shipowner, the longshoreman may sue the shipowner
for the full amount of damages resulting from his injury.2 Alternatively,
regardless of a shipowner's fault, an injured longshoreman is entitled to
statutory compensation payments from the longshoreman's stevedore
employer.' In return for these payments, the stevedore gains statutory
immunity from a longshoreman's negligence suit.' Although Congress in-
" See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970) (amended 1972).
2 See 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1970) (amended 1972); G. GmmoM & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMmALTY § 6-46 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GmmoPE & BLACK].
33 U.S.C. §§ 903-04 (1970) (amended 1972). Under the 1927 LHWCA, a longshoreman
has three possible methods of gaining compensation for his injuries. A longshoreman can
obtain statutory compensation payments under the LHWCA by presenting a claim to the
LHWCA deputy commissioner. 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1976). Thereafter, the commissioner deter-
mines the validity of the longshoreman's application, whether the longshoreman's injury is
covered by the LHWCA, and if the application is approved, makes a formal award of compen-
sation to the longshoreman. Id. Once a formal compensation award is made, the longshore-
man is entitled to a statutorily determined schedule of payments based on the severity of the
injury and the duration of his absence from work. Id. §§ 908-09. If the longshoreman accepts
the formal award, he assigns his cause of action against a third party to his stevedore. Id. §
933(b). If the stevedore successfully sues the third party, the stevedore can retain a portion
of the award to cover court costs, compensation payments made to the longshoreman and a
statutory one fifth share of the total damage award. Id. §§ 933 (b)-(e). The stevedore is then
required to return any excess recovery to the longshoreman. Id. § 933(e). Even though a
longshoreman might accept a formal compensation award, he has a six month statutory
period in which he can bring his own third party action. Id. § 933(b). If the longshoreman
does not recover any damages, or does not recover enough to equal the appropriate compensa-
tion award, the stevedore is obligated to pay only the difference between the amount of the
longshoreman's third party recovery and the amount of the appropriate formal award. Id. §
933(f). Under the third alternative, a longshoreman does not have to accept a formal award
of compensation. Id. § 933(f). Instead, he can forego the award and institute a third party
suit on his own and retain all of his recovery. Id. These provisions were not altered by the
1972 Amendments. See 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976).
Prior to the 1972 Amendments, a stevedore often made voluntary compensation pay-
ments to the longshoreman. In such a situation, a longshoreman could sue a third party on
his own, but courts recognized that a stevedore possessed an "equitable lien" on the long-
shoreman's third-party recovery in an amount equal to the voluntary compensation pay-
ments. See, e.g., The Etna, 138 F.2d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1943). Since the 1972 Amendments, courts
have recognized the continuing validity of the "equitable lien". See, e.g., Allen v. Texaco,
Inc., 510 F.2d 977, 979-81 (5th Cir. 1975).
33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970) (amended 1972) (compensation payments are longshoreman's
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tended the statutory payments to be the stevedore's sole liability for a
longshoreman's injury,5 judicial construction of the LHWCA permitted the
shipowner to bring an. indemnity action against the longshoreman's em-
ployer stevedore in order to recover any award paid by the shipowner to
the longshoreman as a result of a negligence suit.' In effect, the indemnity
suit placed full financial responsibility for a longshoreman's injury on the
stevedore despite the LHWCA's grant of statutory immunity.' In 1972
Congress restored the prejudicial construction status quo by amending the
LHWCAs to eliminate the shipowner's indemnity action against a long-
shoreman's stevedore.? In addition, the 1972 Amendments reaffirmed the
stevedore's immunity from a longshoreman's negligence suit.10 The
Amendments also retained the right of an injured longshoreman to sue a
shipowner who negligently caused the longshoreman's injury." Any award
exclusive remedy against stevedore); GnmoRE & BLACK, supra note 2, at § 6-53.
See 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970) (amended 1972); GnMoPE & BLACK, supra note 2, at § 6-53.
£ In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a
shipowner had an absolute, nondelegable duty to provide for a longshoreman's safety while
the longshoreman was on the shipowner's vessel. As a result, the shipowner was liable for any
injury to a longshoreman regardless of the cause of the injury or the shipowner's negligence.
Id. at 89-100. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952),
the Court held that a negligent shipowner was not entitled to contribution from a concur-
rently negligent stevedore. Subsequently, in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406
(1953), the Court rejected a shipowner's attempt to reduce a longshoreman's recovery by the
amount of the stevedore's lien, see note 3 supra, because of the stevedore's concuurent negli-
gence. The Pope Court noted that since the LHWCA guarantees a stevedore's lien, withhold-
ing the lien was tantamount to stevedore contribution, a concept rejected in Halcyon. Id. at
411-12.
The Supreme Court reversed the effect of these cases in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). The Ryan Court construed § 905 of the LHWCA,
which made compensation payments a longshoreman's exclusive remedy against a stevedore,
as granting immunity to a stevedore only for longshoreman tort suits. Id. at 128-30. The Court
found, however, that § 905 did not grant a stevedore immunity from contractual agreements
to indemnify shipowners who are liable to longshoremen for injuries under Sieracki. Id. at
130-32. The Ryan Court also held that every stevedoring contract contained an implied
agreement for the stevedore to indemnify the shipowner for damages recovered by injured
longshoremen. Id. at 132-33.
7 H. R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4702 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; GILMoRE & BLACK, supra
note 2, at § 6-53.
2 Act of October 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-
950 (1970). See generally George, The Content of the Negligence Action by Longshoreman
Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Act, 2 MAR. LAw. 15 (1977); Robertson, Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Ship-
owners Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 7 MAR. L. & CoM. 447 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976); HOUSE REPoir, supra note 7, at 4701-04.
, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976); HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4704.
" 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4703-04. Under § 905(b)
(1976) a longshoreman may sue a shipowner for an injury caused by the shipowner's negli-
gence. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976). A shipowner's liability is now predicated on land based
negligence principles rather than the concept of a shipowner's nondelegable duty to provide
for longshoreman's safety. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4703-04. In addition, a shipowner
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accruing to a longshoreman as a result of a negligence action, however, is
reduced by an amount proportional to the longshoreman's contributory
negligence. 2 In the recent case Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique,'3 the Fourth Circuit granted a shipowner a similar reduc-
tion in liability according to the stevedore's contributing fault.
Edmonds, a longshoreman employee of an independent stevedore, was
removing chains and jacks used to secure movable cargo containers aboard
a ship owned by Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.' 4 At the direction
of a member of the vessel's crew, Edmonds walked behind a container to
remove a jack.'5 While Edmonds was behind the container, another long-
shoreman tried to pick up the container with a fork lift, causing it to move
backwards and to pin Edmonds against the ship's hull. After receiving
compensation payments from his stevedore for his resulting injuries,'6
Edmonds filed suit against the shipowner, Compagnie Generale, alleging
that Compagnie Generale negligently caused his injury." At trial,'" the
judge submitted a special verdict form'9 to the jury in order to determine
the proportional degrees of negligence of the stevedore, Edmonds, and
Compagnie Generale."° In response to the special verdict, the jury found
that Edmonds's contributory negligence accounted for ten per cent of the
total fault. The jury also found that Compagnie Generale's share of fault
amounted to twenty per cent and the stevedore's share of fault amounted
to seventy per cent." Nevertheless, the trial judge reduced Edmonds'
award only by the amount of his contributory negligence in accordance
with LHWCA provisions. Although Compagnie Generale requested a fur-
ther award reduction proportional to the stevedore's amount of negligence,
the trial judge refused on the ground that the LHWCA does not allow such
may not shift his liability for an injury to the stevedore through an indemnification or
contribution agreement. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4704.
Moreover, a shipowner is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of another. HOUSE
REPoRT, supra note 7, at 4703.
'2 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4705. The House Committee decided that the admi-
ralty concept of comparative negligence should be retained where an injured longshoreman's
negligence contributes to his own injury. Id.; see GrLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 2, at § 6-27a.
"3 558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976), modified 577 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir.); cert. granted, 99 S.
Ct. 348 (1978).
" 558 F.2d at 189-90.
I !d.
' See note 3 supra.
'7 558 F.2d at 189.
" Edmonds was tried twice in the district court. Id. at 189. The first trial resulted in a
verdict for Edmonds. The judge ordered a new trial, however, because of errors in instructing
the jury. Id.
"1 Federal district court judges may use the special verdict form which requires a jury to
return both a general verdict and the jury's answers to specific questions. FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
21 558 F.2d at 189.
21 Id. The jury found Edmonds's total damages to be $100,000. As a result of Edmonds's
contributory negligence, the trial judge reduced the award to $90,000. Id. Compagnie Gener-




a reduction. Compagnie Generale appealed, claiming that a further reduc-
tion in damages was warranted because it was only twenty per cent respon-
sible for Edmonds's injury.Y
On appeal, a Fourth Circuit panel held that Compagnie Generale
would be liable only for an amount equal to its proportional share of Ed-
monds's damages plus the amount of the stevedore's lien.2 The panel
reasoned that the 1972 Amendments make a shipowner liable only for
injury caused by the shipowner's negligence .2 In addition, the panel deter-
mined that the 1972 Amendments grant a stevedore a statutory right to
repayment of compensation payments made to the longshoreman if the
longshoreman wins a damage award from the shipowner." The panel rea-
soned that the stevedore's statutory right to a lien on a recovery might
conflict with a shipowner's right to freedom from liability for the negli-
gence of others if the shipowner were allowed to reduce damages because
of the stevedore's contributing negligence. 2 The Fourth Circuit panel con-
cluded, however, that such a conflict was not irreconcilable.? Since Con-
gress intended a trade-off between the interests of shipowners and steve-
dores under the 1972 Amendments, the panel reasoned that a comparative
negligence formula which reduces a damage award by an amount propor-
tional to the stevedore's contributing fault would preserve a shipowner's
interest under the 1972 Amendments.? Moreover, requiring a shipowner to
pay the stevedore's lien would preserve the stevedore's interest in the long-
shoreman's recovery without significantly harming the shipowner's inter-
ests. The panel also noted that its utilization of the comparative negli-
=Id.
2 Id. at 193-94. The panel awarded Edmonds $20,000, Compagnie Generale's propor-
tional share of the damages, as well as an amount equal to the stevedore's lien. Id.
24 Id. at 191; see note 11 supra.
2 558 F.2d at 192-93; see note 3 supra.
2, 558 F.2d at 191; see note 28 infra.
v Id. at 192.
2Id. at 192-93. The panel reasoned that Congress intended both a shipowner and a
stevedore to benefit from the 1972 Amendments. Id. at 191-92. The stevedore benefits from
the Amendments through the abolition of the shipowner's indemnity action. Id. at 191; HousE
REPoirr, supra note 7, at 4701-04. The shipowner also benefits since Congress abolished the
doctrine of unseaworthiness and insulated the shipowner from liability for the negligent acts
of others. 558 F.2d at 191; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4705; see notes 6 & 11 supra.
2 Although the shipowner is forced to pay the stevedore's lien, in apparent contravention
of congressional intent, see text accompanying note 26 supra; note 28 supra, the panel decided
that the payment was necessary to preserve the stevedore's right to a lien under the 1972
Amendments. 558 F.2d at 193. The panel noted that the 1972 Amendments not only preserve
the statutory lien, but preserve the equitable lien as well. Id. at 193; see note 3 supra. The
panel was concerned that the statutory lien might not be preserved in all situations if a
shipowner were liable only for its own proportional negligence. 558 F.2d at 192. For example,
if the award resulting from a shipowner's proportional negligence were less than the amount
of the stevedore's lien, the stevedore would not receive full reimbursement because a long-
shoreman is only obligated to return the amount of the award if the award is less than the
compensation payments. Id. The panel reasoned that failure to reimburse the stevedore fully
in this situation constitutes contribution by the stevedore, a concept rejected by the 1972
Amendments and Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 192-93; see note 6 supra. Therefore, the
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gence concept was justified in light of the Supreme Court decisions decided
subsequent to the 1972 Amendments."
On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit en banc adopted the panel's reduction
of Edmonds's award according to the degree of the stevedore's concurrent
negligence.3 However, the court reversed the panel's decision to award
Edmonds an additional amount equal to the stevedore's lien.2 The court
concurred with the panel's interpretation of the shipowner's and steve-
dore's rights under the 1972 Amendments," but did not agree with the
panel's determination that a judicially created reduction of damages, ac-
cording to the degree of a stevedore's fault, is necessary to prevent a con-
flict between stevedore and shipowner interests under the 1972 Amend-
ments. "
Rather than adopting the panel's analysis that the resolution of the
case rested on a judicially constructed formula, the court reasoned that
such a reduction of damages can be based on an interpretation of the
language of section 905(b) of the LHWCA11 The first sentence of section
905(b) provides that a longshoreman may bring an action against a shi-
powner whose negligence caused the longshoreman's injury.3 The court
interpreted this sentence as imposing full liability for a longshoreman's
injury on a shipowner if the shipowner's negligence contributed in any way
to the injury. 7 In contrast, the second sentence of section 905(b) provides
that if the injured longshoreman were injured by the negligence of his
stevedore or his fellow longshoremen, the longshoreman may not bring a
negligence action against the shipowner." The court concluded that if the
second sentence were interpreted to bar any recovery from a shipowner by
a longshoreman if his stevedore or fellow longshoremen contributed in any
way to his injury, then the two sentences would be irreconcilable when
panel concluded that a stevedore's interests would be preserved in all situations by increasing
a longshoreman's award by the amount of the stevedore's lien. 558 F.2d at 192-93.
Id. at 193. The panel cited Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106
(1974), for the proposition that the Supreme Court recognizes great flexibility in the alloca-
tion of damages between concurrently negligent parties in admiralty law. 558 F.2d at 193.
The panel also cited United States Lines v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), for
the proposition that allocation of damages between comparatively negligent parties is an
accepted practice in admiralty law. 558 F.2d at 193.
31 577 F.2d 1153, 1154 (4th Cir. 1978).
1Id. at 1154-55.
33 Id.; see text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
11 577 F.2d at 1154-55.
31 Id. at 1155. Section 905(b) of the LHWCA provides in part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negli-
gence of a vessel, then such person . . . may bring an action against such ves-
sel. . . . If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services,
no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of
persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
36 See note 35 supra.
3 577 F.2d at 1155.
38 See note 35 supra.
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applied to a longshoreman injury caused by the stevedore's and shi-
powner's concurring negligence. 9 Deciding that Congress had not intended
such a conflict in section 905(b), the court determined that the inconsis-
tency could be reconciled only if section 905(b) were interpreted to author-
ize apportionment of damages."0 Such an interpretation allows a reduction
of a longshoreman's award based on his stevedore's contributing negli-
gence, but does not allow an award of money solely for the purpose of
satisfying the stevedore's lien. 1 Thus, the court held that Compagnie Gen-
erale was liable only for twenty per cent of Edmonds' total damages.4"
The Fourth Circuit's reconciliation of section 905(b) is consistent with
a generally accepted rule of statutory construction. If a statute, which
appears to have only one interpretation produces either an inequitable or
absurd result in the situation which the statute's drafters were attempting
to control, a court may interpret the statute according to the perceived
intent of the drafters. 3 In the context of a longshoreman's action against
a shipowner, Congress has attempted to control the allocation of damages
among the responsible parties.44 Where one party is solely at fault, section
905(b) allocates full responsibility for the longshoreman's damages to that
party.4" Thus, when the shipowner is solely at fault, the longshoreman may
recover full damages from the shipowner." However, when a shipowner and
a stevedore both contribute to a longshoreman's injury, reading the statute
as holding only one party totally responsible for the longshoreman's dam-
" 577 F.2d at 1155.
40 Id.
41 Id.
41 Id. at 1156. Besides arguing that § 905(b) does not allow apportionment of damages,
Edmonds claimed that the common law principle of full recovery of damages from a single
joint tortfeasor is subsumed into a longshoreman's action by the 1972 Amendments. Edmonds
supported this assertion by arguing that land based negligence principles should be used in
a longshoreman's suit against a shipowner. Id. at 1155; see note 11 supra. The court rejected
this claim on the ground that many states have changed the common law rules for recovery
from a single joint tortfeasor. 577 F.2d at 1155. The court also reasoned that Congress would
not have abolished the shipowner's indemnity action against a stevedore if Congress had
intended to hold a shipowner fully liable for a longshoreman's damages. Id. Moreover, the
court noted that the language of § 905(b) suggests that a shipowner would not be required to
pay for the stevedore's share of the total fault. Id. The court did not decide whether a
stevedore may recover its statutory lien from a longshoreman's reduced damage award be-
cause the stevedore was not made a party to the action in Edmonds. Id. at 1156. The court
suggested, however, that a stevedore should be made a party in subsequent cases similar to
Edmonds so that the rights of all concerned parties might be litigated in a single hearing. Id.
4 United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971); Reed v. The Yaka, 373
U.S. 410, 415 (1963); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1962); 2A C. SANDS, SUTHER-
LAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.12 (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SANDS].
" See House REPORT, supra note 7, at 4702-04.
" See Coleman, The 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA: Life Expectancy of an Equitable
Credit, 12 FORUM 683, 684-85 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Coleman, Life Expectancy]; Cole-
man & Daly, Equitable Credit: Apportionment of Damages According to Fault in Tripartite
Litigation Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 35 MD. L. REv. 351, 368-69 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Coleman & Daly].
4" See Coleman, Life Expectancy, supra note 45, at 685-86; Coleman & Daly, supra note
45, at 368-69.
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ages will contravene Congress's intent that a shipowner is to be liable only
for his own negligence. " Thus, if the shipowner is only one per cent at fault,
while the stevedore is ninety-nine per cent at fault, the shipowner would
pay all the damages despite Congress' intent to the contrary. 8 Since a
statute is presumed to be internally consistent,49 a court should be free to
interpret section 905(b) to harmonize the statutory language with congres-
sional intent." Interpreting section 905(b) to allow a reduction of a long-
shoreman's damages according to the degree of a stevedore's contributing
negligence effectuates congressional intent to insulate a shipowner from
liability for another party's negligence.' In addition, nor is congressional
intent to allow a longshoreman some recovery from a negligent shipowner
frustrated by shifting full liability for the longshoreman's injury to the
statutorily immune stevedore who contributed to the longshoreman's in-
jury. 5
2
In Edmonds, the Fourth Circuit departed from the position of other
circuits that a shipowner is not entitled to a reduction of damages propor-
tional to the stevedore's contributing negligence. 3 In contrast to the Fourth
Circuit's focus on statutory interpretation, the other circuits have refused
to reduce a shipowner's liability on public policy grounds. 4 These courts
do not interpret section 905(b) to allow a reduction in damages, because
to do so would unjustifiably take a recovery for damages away from an
injured longshoreman who may not have contributed to his own injury in
any way.5 In addition, these circuits reason that requiring a partially
negligent shipowner to bear the whole burden of a longshoreman's damages
,' See Coleman, Life Expectancy, supra note 45, at 684-85; Coleman & Daly, supra note
45, at 368-69; text accompanying note 26 supra. Since a longshoreman is limited to recovery
of compensation payments from his stevedore, the longshoreman will lose any benefit of a
third party action if the shipowner's negligence is imputed to the stevedore. Coleman & Daly,
supra note 45, at 368-69.
" Coleman & Daly, supra note 45, at 368-69.
,' SANDS, supra note 43, at § 46.06.
"0 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
11 Coleman & Daly, supra note 45, at 368-69.
52 Id.
In Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 936 (1976), the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court decision to grant a shipowner
a reduction in its liability to a longshoreman based upon a stevedore's contributing negli-
gence. The court held that when a shipowner and a stevedore both contribute to a longshore-
man's injury, the shipowner and a stevedore become joint tortfeasors. See id. at 680. As a
joint tortfeasor, a shipowner may be liable to an injured longshoreman for all of the longshore-
man's damages. Id. Although a longshoreman could theoretically sue the stevedore as a joint
tortfeasor for full damages, the LHWCA's grant of immunity prohibits a longshoreman from
suing a negligent stevedore. Id.; accord, Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas,
573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
1, See Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir.
1978); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
-1 Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 889 (5th Cir. 1978);
Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1975).
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